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Aristide 
and  the 
Briand,  Gustav  Stresemann 
unity of  Europe 
Aristide  Briand  and  Gustav  Stresemann  formulated  proposals  for  a  united 
federal Europe as early as the late  1920's and early 1930's at a time when Europe 
was threatened by fascism  and the world economic depression.  They served as  an 
inspiration  to resistance  leaders  and as  an  intellectual  point of departure  for  the 
post-war fathers of Europe. 
Aristide  Briand,  born  at  Nantes  in  1862,  and 
Gustav Stresemann, born in Berlin in 1878, had one 
thing in common from the beginning, they were both 
sons of innkeepers. Their early careers were, however, 
very different. Briand studied law in Paris, where he 
very  much identified  himself with  socialist  politics. 
Together  with  Jean  Jaures  he  founded  "L'Huma-
nite." At this time he was very far to the Left and at 
the Nantes conference of the socialist party in 1894 
he secured the adoption of the idea of the General 
Strike. His acceptance of a ministry in 1906 brought 
about his inevitable exclusion from the socialist party 
still wedded to the idea of no co-operation with the 
bourgeois  state.  In the  classic  French  tradition  he 
then moved steadily to the right. In 1909 Clemenceau 
fell from power and Briand became Prime Minister 
for the first time. He was to hold the office ten times 
in all. 
Stresemann's rise though meteoric by the standards 
of Imperial Germany was  much slower.  After three 
and a  half years  at the  Universities  of  Berlin  and 
Leipzig, he completed his Doctorate in 1900  with a 
dissertation  on  the  Berlin  beer  industry.  Having 
decided upon a career in business he then accepted a 
post  as  assistant  to  the  chairman  of  the  German 
chocolate  makers' union  in  Dresden.  Within  a  few 
years  he  had  made  an outstanding  success  of  this 
ventUTe. In 1903 he joined the National Liberal Party 
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and in 1907 at the age of twenty-nine he was elected 
to the Reichstag for the first time. 
The war of 1914-1918 
Both  men  supported  the  war,  Stresemann  more 
enthusiastically than Briand. Stresemann at that time 
was  one of the National Liberals of whom it could 
truly  be  said  that  they  were  more  national  than 
liberal. His support of the "annexationist" claims of 
the  High  Command  was  very  popular  within  his 
own  party  and  in  1917  Stresemann  became  Chair-
man of  the  Parliamentary Party though not of  the 
nationa,l party organisation. 
The post-war world 
The  careeTs  of  both  men  suffered  a  temporary 
eclipse in the immediate post-war period. Briand had 
been displaced by  Clemenceau in 1917  and he  took 
little  part  in  French  public  life  again  until  1921. 
Stresemann's fall, identified as he had been with the 
goals  of  the  militarists,  was  more  far-reaching.  He 
was  excluded  from  the  Democratic  Party,  the  first 
successor  party to  the  National  Liberals.  He  then 
promptly  set  up  a  party  of  his  own,  the  German Peoples Party, the D.V.P. Between 1918 and 1923 he 
remained a monarchist and carried on an essentially 
nationalist  opposition  to  the  Weimar  Republic. 
especially after the signature of the Ver~sailles Treaty. 
In 1920,  for  instance,  he  was  prepared  to  support 
the  Kapp  Putsch  which  overthrew  the  legitimate 
government.  Gradually  he  came  to  realise  that  the 
Republic was  a necessity, mainly through his  expe-
rience  as  Chairman  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Com-
mittee of the Reichstag. He became what was often 
called  a  "Vemunftrepublikaner"-a  republican  in 
mind if not in heart. 
Immediately  after  taking  office  as  Chancellor  in 
October  1923  Stresemann  was  faced  with  a  grave 
crisis  in Franco-German relations,  due  to  the  con-
tinued French occupation of the  Ruhr.  Stresemann, 
despite the nationalist nature of  his  past and much 
of  his  support,  decided  to  abandon  the  policy  of 
passive resistance ~to the French. While this step cost 
him the Chancellorship  he  was  retained as  Foreign 
Minister and the decision proved to be the beginning 
of the end of the Ruhr crisis. New elections brought 
men  of  the  moderate  Left,  Herriot  in  France  and 
MacDonald in Britain, to office.  In the new climate 
the Locamo agreement was  signed in October 1925. 
Locamo 
The Locamo agreement was  a  high  point in the 
history of interwar Europe and was  felt at the time 
to  have  ushered  in  a  new  era.  The  essence  of  the 
agreement was  to  provide a  solution to the Franco-
German problem. It was  an ingenious  solution that 
reconciled  the  French desire  for  security  with  the 
German  wish  for  the  recovery  of  a  place  in  the 
community of Europe; Britain and Italy were to act 
as  guarantors  not  of  France,  of  Belgium  or  of 
Germany, but of the frontiers  between the first  two 
and  the  last.  While  the  treaty  thus  guaranteed 
Germany's  western frontier, it did not do  so  in the 
East  where  Stresemann  refused  to  enter  into  any 
engagements. It did, however, usher in a new era of 
Franco-German unity, the more especially since one 
of the preconditions  for  France  had been  German 
renunciation  of  her  claims  on  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Stresemann,  like  Adenauer later  in relation  to  the 
Saar,  accepted  this  without  demur  since  the  terri-
tories  were  lost in any case.  In the  new  climate  of 
friendship,  Briand was  one  of the  prime movers  of 
the  German  candidacy  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
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which was accepted in 1926. In the same year Briand, 
Stresemann  and Chamberlain were  jointly  awarded 
the Nobel Prize for Peace. 
Briand's proposals for a "federal bond" 
The  background  to  the  Briand  proposal<S  was 
provided  by  the  cordial  nature  of  Franco-German 
relations  and  the  ideas  of  Count  Coudenhove-
Calergi.  Coudenhove-Calergi  published  his  book 
"Pan-Europa"  in  1923  and  very  quickly  became 
intimate with  Herriot and Briand. Herriot espoused 
the  idea  of  a  United  States  of  Europe  as  early 
as  1925. 
Briand became converted more  slowly  but at the 
meeting of the League Council in Madrid-in June 
1929- he talked over the idea of an initiative in this 
direction  with  Stresemann.  Briand  announced  his 
project  on  5  September  1929  at  the  lOth  session 
of  the  League  of  Nations  assembly.  Briand  spoke 
with the  two-fold authority of his  personal prestige 
and of his position as French foreign minister when 
he said: 
"I ,fuink  that  among  peoples  constituting  geo-
graphical groups like the peoples of Europe, there 
should be some kind of federal bond; it should be 
possible for  them  to  get  in touch  at any  time, 
to confer about their interests, to agree on joint 
resolutions and to establish amongst themselves 
a bond of solidarity which  will enable them, if 
need be, to meet any grave emergency that might 
arise. This is the link I want to forge. Obviously, 
this association will be primarily economic, for 
that is  the most urgent aspect of the  question, 
and  I  think we  may  look  for  success  in that 
direction.  Still,  I  am convinced that, politically 
and socially also, this federal <link might without 
affecting  the  sovereignty  of  any  of  the  nations 
belonging to such an association do useful work; 
and I  propose during this  session to  ask  those 
of my  colleagues who  here represent European 
nations  to  be  good  enough  to  consider  this 
question  unofficially  and to  submit  it to  their 
governments  for  examination,  so  that  these 
possibilities  which I  see  in the suggestion  may 
be translated into realities later." 
Briand's  proposal  was  supported  by  Stresemann who  characteristically  supported  Briand's  speech 
while attacking the Versailles settlement. 
"Why should the idea of uniting all the elements 
that can bring the countries of Europe together 
be impossible ? ... I absolutely reject any politi-
cal  ideas  directed  against other continents  and 
anything  that could  be  interpreted  as  an  eco-
nomic autarchy of Europe, but it does  seem to 
me  that  a  great  deal  has  not  been  done  that 
could  still be  done. . .  How  many  things  there 
are  that  appear  so  extraordinarily  arbitrary 
about Europe and its construction from the eco-
nomic point of view ... The Treaty of Versailles 
has created a large number of new  states. I do 
not  propose  to  discuss  the  political  aspects  of 
the Treaty of Versailles; I assume that my views 
on it are known. But I should like to emphasize 
the  economic  aspect  and  say  that  this  treaty, 
while  creating  a  large  number  of  new  states, 
entirely ignores the question of their incorpora-
tion  in  the  general  economic  system  of 
Europe. . .  Are  not  the  subdivisions  born  of 
national prestige  ~long since out of date and do 
they not do our continent an immense amount of 
harm, not only in the relations between various 
countries but also in those between Europe and 
other continents?" 
Briand,  after  a  private discussion  with  the  dele-
gates  of the European member states, undertook to 
prepare a memorandum. The fates were against him 
however.  The  world  economic  crisis  deepened  and 
Stresemann died in October 1929. 
The Briand Memorandum 
Briand's  memorandum,  "Sur  )'organisation  d'un 
regime  d'union federale europeenne" was  published 
on  1st  May  1930.  This  provided  for  the  establish-
ment of a "European conference" composed of the 
representatives of all the  European states  belonging 
to the League of Nations. This conference was to be 
founded upon three principles: 
1.  "The  general  subordination  of  the  economic 
problem to the  political problem." 
2.  "The principle that European political coopera-
tion should be directed towards ...  a federation based 
on the idea of union and not of unity, that is to say, 
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a federation  elastic enough to respect  the independ-
ence and national sovereignty of each while guaran-
teeing  to  all  the  benefits  of collective  solidarity." 
3.  ~~The principle  that the  economic  organisation 
of  Europe  should  be  directed  towards ...  a  rap-
prochement  of  the  European  economic  systems 
effected  under  the  political  supervision  of the  gov-
ernments acting in concert." 
M.  Briand, or perhaps the anonymous drafters at 
the  Quay  d'Orsay,  were  at pains  to  forestall  two 
possible criticisms that the plans might interfere with 
the  sovereign  independence  of  states  and the func-
tions of the League of Nations. 
The proposed federation  then was  to be a moral 
union  of Europe  based  upon  the  existence  of the 
solidarity established  between the states of Europe. 
The  participating  states  were  not  required  to  sur-
render any powers to the federal authority, but were 
merely  to  undertake  to  get  into  touch  regularly  in 
order to examine in  common all questions likely to 
be  of  interest  to  the  Commonwealth  of  Europe 
peoples. 
In regard  to  the  relations  between  the  proposed 
European Federal Union and the League of Nations, 
he  presented  the  Union  as  a  bond  of  solidarity 
which  would  permit  the  nations  of Europe  at  last 
to become conscious of the geographical unity of the 
continent and to realise within the framework of the 
League,  one  of those  regional  understandings  that 
were  formally  recommended in the covenant. 
Many  criticisms  can  be  made  of  the  plan.  The 
three European non-members of the League, Turkey, 
Russia  and Iceland  were  not to  be  asked  to  join. 
It failed to face up to the necessity for creating some 
supra-national European political institution without 
which  every  single  state  would  retain  the  power 
of  veto  on  all actions.  The  earlier  priorities  were 
reversed. The new emphasis was to be on the politi-
cal not the economic sector; an understandable deci-
sion  in  face  of  the  depression-it  nevertheless 
condemned the plan to impotence.  That it was  the 
most  that could  be  hoped  became  clear  from  the 
replies of the various governments. 
The twenty-six replies received were at best luke-
warm. The participation of the United Kingdom was 
seen as  a sine qua non and the attitude of the  UK 
could best be described as guardedly hostile. On  8th  September  1930,  delegates  from  the 
twenty-seven European members of the League met 
privately at Geneva to decide what action should be 
taken at the 11th session of the Assembly regarding 
the plan. It was  decided to  submit the plan to  the 
Assembly for further study on the  16th September. 
Further progress was  more or less  ruled out by the 
spectacular success of the Nazis in the German elec-
tion of 14th September 1930. After the debate on the 
16th September it was  decided to set up a Commis-
sion of Inquiry for European Union with the Secre-
tary-General  of  the  League  as  its  Secretary.  This 
Commission  extended  an  invitation  to  the  three 
excluded  governments,  Turkey,  Iceland  and  the 
USSR,  to  participate  in  the  discussions:  all three 
governments accepted. What discussion there was  of 
Briand's plan in 1931  had no more reality or pros-
pects of realisation than the interminable discussion 
on disarmament. The climate of Geneva was chang-
ing  under  the  impact  of  the world  depression,  the 
spirit of Locarno as Mussolini put it had evaporated, 
the heyday of the League was  past.  Briand died  a 
weary  and  broken man in  1932  after  having  been 
Foreign Minister continuously since 1926. 
The present day significance 
Stresemann,  though  much  less  imaginative  and 
far-reaching in his  ideas than Briand, has tended to 
be seen as more relevant than Briand. His move from 
nationalism  of a  very belligerent kind to  a  realiza-
tion of the limitations inherent in Germany's position 
was an experience familiar to a whole generation of 
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post-World  War II Germans.  His  low-key,  unemo-
tional  realism,  his  policy  of  Franco-German  rap-
prochement, his abandonment of territorial claims in 
the West anticipated the main features of Adenauer's 
policy.  As  with  Adenauer  his  attitudes  towards 
Eastern Europe  would now  be  seen  as  less  praise-
worthy.  In  general  terms  then  he  calculated  like 
Adenauer that hindrances to Germany's international 
position  could  not  be  removed  by  acting  intransi-
gently,  but by  acting  politically,  by  exploiting  the 
latent  opportunities  for  change  in  the  status  quo. 
Briand's  initiative,  like  his  pact  with  Kellog  in 
1928  to  renounce  the  use  of  force,  is  more  of  a 
grand gesture, a factor of symbolic importance. They 
were both important attempts to reduce the risks of 
international  politics,  to  de-emphasise  what  Max 
Kohnstamm  has  called  the  law  of  the  jungle  in 
international relations.  Ineffective  in the  Europe of 
the '30s, menaced by fascism and the world economic 
depression, they served as an inspiration to resistance 
leaders and an intellectual point of departure for the 
post-war  fathers  of Europe,  Spaak,  Monnet,  Schu-
man, Adenauer and De Gasperi. 
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At the end of the nineteenth century  there were  in  Western  Europe economi-
cally advanced regions with features clearly differentiated from those found in other 
regions.  The  most advanced  regions  focussed  on  coalfields  and  ports  and  their 
economies were  largely  based on coal  mining,  metallurgical and textile industries. 
The twentieth century has witnessed a change  in  the  regional  structure  with new 
industries  growing,  older  regions  declining,  and,  within  the  rural  areas,  a 
marked division between the richer and poorer regions.  To balance  the growth of 
the  richer  regions  with  the  decline  of  the  poorer  regions  is  a  major  problem 
facing  the governments of the  nations of Western  Europe.  This regional  problem 
will be discussed  in  a series of articles.  In this one  we shall examine,  in  general 
terms,  the  problems  of the  declining  regions.  Articles  in  future  issues  will  deal 
with the  institutions established  to  promote  regional  growth  and detailed  studies 
will be made of particular regions,  including Wallonia,  Brittany and Scotland. 
A recent study 
1  of the EEC has divided the terri-
tory of the Six into three regions: agricultural regions, 
industrial regions and semi-industrial regions. 
Agricultural  regions  mostly lack industries  which 
are  not  based  on  agriculture;  persons  engaged  in 
farming  account  for  20-40%  of  their  total  labour 
force;  their  infrastructure 
1  is  underdeveloped,  and 
their  tertiary  sector,  i.e.,  service  activities  such  as 
banking, insurance and transport, may be relatively 
large  but it  is  hinged  mainly  on  agriculture.  The 
population density is  low, usually less  than 100  per-
sons  per  square  kilometre.  Accounting  for  some 
50  million  people,  the  agricultural  regions  occupy 
more than half the total land area of the Six. 
Industrial  regions  are marked by high population 
densities, usually more than 200  persons per square 
kilometre, and a small proportion of the population 
(less  than  10 %)  engaged  in  agriculture.  The infra-
1  Memorandum  on Regional Policy  in  the  Community (see  Further 
reading). 
2  Infrastructure  in  an  umbrella  term  used  to  cover  means  of 
transport,  communications  and  telecommunications,  housing  and  all 
the  facilities  which  enable  urban  areas  to  fulfil  their  many  functions, 
with all that this  means in terms  of services  and environment, including 
places  for  living,  working  and  enjoying  leisure.  It  includes  public 
amenities such  as  water  and  electricity,  education and  me~ical services. 
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structure is  well developed and there is  considerable 
tertiary  activity.  Accounting  for  some  75  million 
inhabitants,  these  industrial  regions  occupy  some 
16 % of the Community's area. 
Semi-industrial  regions  are in the  early stages  of 
industrial growth. Some  15 % of their population is 
engaged  in  farming  and  the  population  density  is 
about 150 persons per square kilometre. They have a 
fairly  well-developed  infrastructure  and a  relatively 
small tertiary sector. These regions occupy about one-
third of  the  Community's  territory  and account for 
some 55 million people. 
Within these large regions  there are some smaller 
regions which  are growing  economically, and others 
which are marking time or declining. 
The declining 
agricultural  regions 
These are distributed around ·the  periphery of the 
map and among the highland areas. They include the 
southern peninsula of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, the west and south of France, central Wales, northern 
Scotland,  parts  of  the  Alps,  the  Appennines,  the 
Pyrenees and the French Central Massif. 
The  population  in  these  regions  is  scattered 
through  many  farms,  small  villages  and  market 
centres.  Pressure  from  overseas  competitors  which 
intensified  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  increased 
as  trade barriers  were  lowered and transport facili-
ties  became more efficient.  In Britain one  can look 
to the effects of the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 
upon cereal farming, and, later in the century, to the 
impact  of  the  arrival  of  refrigerated  cargoes  of 
mutton  and  beef  upon  livestock  farming.  Similar 
pressures  were  experienced  by  farmers  in  the  Six. 
Imported  grain  and  meat  poured  into  European 
markets  from  North and  South  America  and  Aus-
tralasia. 
Table  1  Employment in agriculture in the EEC and the UK 
1950  1960  1968 
Number employed 
I 
%  of total  Number employed 
I 
%  of total  Number employed 
I 
%  of total 
(thousands)  employed  (thousands)  employed  (thousands)  employed 
Belgium  368  11.3  257  7.7  201  4.3 
France  5,438  28.3  4,029  20.7  3,108  15.5 
Germany  5,020  24.7  3,623  13.8  2,630  10.0 
Italy  6,945  41.0  5,870  30.8  4,254  23.2 
Luxemburg  32  24.0  22  16.4  17  11.4 
Netherlands  553  14.1  429  10.3  352  7.7 
EEC  18,336  28.8  14,229  19.65  10,562  14.6 
UK  1,196  5.1  1,031  4.0  730  2.9 
Sources:  Memorandum on the  reform of agriculture in the  EEC Commission  of  the  European Communities,  1968  ;  Basic  statistics  of the Community, 
Statistical  office  of  the  European  Communities. 
In the rural villages craftsmen had produced high-
quality  goods,  such  as  wool  textiles  and  timber 
products, and these had been sold in the expanding 
urban industrial centres. Mass-produced goods from 
urban factories came to compete with the craftsman's 
products and this resulted in local redundancies. 
The exodus  of rural inhabitants  from  farms  and 
villages  to  the  industrial  towns  and  to  overseas 
countries  increased  through  the  nineteenth  century 
and has continued up to the present. The mechanisa-
tion of agriculture plus  the rationalisation of farms 
into  more  efficient  units  have  sustained  rural 
depopulation. Although  production figures  for most 
agricultural products have increased in recent years, 
the  movement of people  out of  agriculture  has  not 
been halted. The drift from the land can be seen in 
table  1. 
In general  the declining  agricultural  regions  are 
characterised  by  low  per  capita  incomes.  aging 
populations,  low  standards  of  living  and  a  lack of 
new  private inve,stment.  The  result  of ,these  condi-
tions.  briefly,  is  rural  depopulation,  wi,th  young 
people  leaving  the  regions  to  migrate  to  industrial 
centres or overseas countries. 
Within the declining  agricultural  regions  one  can 
distinguish three regional types. 
a)  The hill and mountain regions 
These regions  have  supported small communities 
based  on  subsistence  farming.  The  paucity  of  the 
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phy,sical  resources  together  with  the  isolation  of 
upland  areas  from  more  developed  areas  have 
rendered  the  farms  only  marginally  viable.  The 
underdeveloped  infrastructures  have  resulted  in 
depopulation.  Adequate  educational  and  medical 
facilities cannot be provided in regions which cannot 
readily  attract  professional  personnel,  and  where 
good  transport  facilities  and supplies  of water  and 
electricity may be lacking. High altitudes combined 
with adverse winter weather conditions increase the 
isolation of these regions. Faced with these conditions 
young families  leave these  regions  and whole  com-
munities have ceased to exist. Small cultivated areas 
have returned to  forest  and heathland.  Parts of the 
Scottish  Highlands,  the  Ardennes  and  the  Alps 
exhibit these features. 
b)  France, south of the Loire and west of the Rhone 
Included in this  large  region  are  the Landes, the 
Central Massif and the Pyrenees. The Central Massif 
and  the  Pyrenees  have  conditions  similar  to  those 
already  outlined  above.  The  Landes  is  a  coastal 
area  of  dunes  and  sandy  soils  which  are  being 
reclaimed  mainly  by  afforestation.  Generally  the 
whole  of  south-west France is  of marginal  agricul-
tural  value  and depopulation is  a  feature.  The rate 
of  exodus  of young  persons  is  not matched by  the 
influx  of  new  families.  The  income  derived  from 
agricultural  activities  is  insufficient  to  provide  an 
adequate  standard  of  living.  Farms  are  small  and highly skilled farmers  cannot receive adequate com-
pensation  for  their  skills;  such  farmers  are  more 
profitably employed in the more affiuent agricultural 
regions.  In the  last decade  in France some  130,000 
persons per year have left agriculture and this move-
ment is  most  obvious  in  the  south-west  of  France. 
c)  The Mezzogiomo 
Despite a high rate of emigration the Mezzogiorno 
continues to  have a  high population density, with a 
high birth rate. The underemployment of the popula-
tion  accelerates  rural  depopulation  and this  further 
reduces  the chances of new  development coming  to 
the region.  The agricultural economy is  poor, being 
characterized by  subsistence farming on small units, 
and there are few marginal benefits to ameliorate the 
poor living  conditions.  Rural  depopulation  has  not 
only resulted in farms  going  out of  production but 
it has  also  reduced  the social  viability of the small 
villages and towns. 
The older industrial  regions 
These regions  profited  largely from  the industrial 
revolution of the nineteenth century. The use of coal 
for  power  production,  access  to  large  markets  at 
home and abroad, the availability of large  reserves 
of  cheap,  unskilled  labour,  the  supplies  of  capital 
for investment from commerdal activities in various 
parts  of  the  world,  resulted  in  the  creation  of 
industrial  regions  based  upon  textile  and  heavy 
metallurgical industries. Today some of these regions 
are experiencing economic difficulties, including: 
•  underemployment of existing labour forces; 
•  reduction  in  the  quality  of  housing  facilities 
and the urban environment; 
•  out-dated  urban  centres,  often  congested  and 
polluted by  intensive vehicular use, which  result in 
inefficient trading and transport facilities; 
•  the  closure  of some  labour-intensive  industries 
and the introduction of new  capital-intensive indus-
tries. 
The expression "urban blight" is  sometimes  used 
to summarize the characteristics of these older indus-
!trial  regions.  Regions  with  some  or  all  of  the 
characteristi·cs listed above include: 
•  in Germany,  parts  of  the Ruhr  ~nd Saar coal-
fields, small isolated valleys and mining centres in the 
Siegerland,  the Harz and in Hesse,  also  the  textile 
centres of Munster, Mtinchen-Gladbach and parts of 
Franconia; 
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•  in  Belgium,  the  whole  of  the  Sambre-Meuse 
coalfields, and, to a lesser extent, the mining centres 
in the Campine; 
•  in  France,  the  coalfields  of  the  Centre-Midi 
(Loire, Cevennes, Aquitaine, and Auvergne), also the 
larger  textile  centres  of  the  Nord  and  Vosges,  the 
iron ore mining and steel centres of Lorraine, certain 
port regions, such as  Saint-Nazaire, where the tradi-
tional industries are experiencing problems; 
•  in Luxemburg, the iron and steel centres in the 
south; 
•  in  the  Netherlands,  parts  of  the  port  regions 
which  rely  upon  older  industries,  plus  the  peat-
producing centres of Drenthe and the coal centres of 
Limburg; 
•  in Italy, some localized centres of shipbuilding, 
and mining centres based upon mercury and sulphur; 
•  in Britain,  the cotton towns  of Lancashire, the 
coalfields  of South Wales, the North-East and Scot-
land, the shipbuilding centres of the North-East and 
North-West,  and  the  smaller  ports  in  Wales,  the 
South-West and Eastern Scotland. 
The degree  of the decline varies from  one region 
to  another  and from  place to place within any  one 
region.  The most  seriously  affected  regions  are the 
small colliery centres, 
1  the cotton textile towns  and 
the  whole  of  the  Sambre-Meuse  industrial  area. 
These areas share the following features: 
•  they  are  the victims  of  the  exhaustion  of  the 
resources  on  which  they  were  founded,  e.g.,  the 
complete  exploitation  of  profitable  coal  seams  and 
the replacement of  coal by cheaper forms  of power 
supply; 
•  new  industries  have  either not moved  to these 
areas, or, if they have, they have proved insufficient. 
The dominant industry employed a high proportion 
of the regional labour force  and the old, traditional 
economic  and  social  structures  have  discouraged 
entrepreneurs from developing new industries; 
•  the employees  have  skills  which  cannot  easily 
be employed in other indus·tries; 
•  in  the  process  of  modernisation  some  of  the 
older  industries  have  increased  their  total  output 
figures  but  these  increases  have  been  achieved  by 
employing capital-intensive methods and by rational-
ising  the  production  units.  Thus  coal  production 
figures show an increase while the numbers employed 
in coal mining have fallen drastically. 
A  comparative  study  of  the  older,  declining 
industrial  regions  with  the  newer  growing  regions 
would  reveal  differences  in  1the  types  of  energy 
employed,  in  the  degree  of ·labour-intensity  and  in 
the types of labour employed, in the dependence on 
1  See  table  2  and  table  3 Table 2 
The changes in the numbers employed in coalmining 
in the EEC in 1967 and 1968 
Total  No. 
of  employees  Change  from  Percentage 
in coal  Dec. 1967  change 
mining  in  1967-1968 
Dec.  1968 
Germany  264,200  -23,200  -8% 
Belgium  54,000  -6,800  -11% 
France  141,600  -17,900  -11% 
Italy  1,700  0 
Netherlands  32,700  -6,000  -16% 
EEC  494,200  -53,900  -10% 
Source:  Table 7 in Les problemes de  main-d'ceuvre dans Ia  Communaute 
en  1969,  published  by  the  EEC in  May  1969. 
Table 3 
The changes in the numbers employed in coalmining in the EEC in 1967  and 1968 
Number of miners  (underground and surface)  (in  thousands) 
1968 
1955 
Ger. 
200.1 
502.5 
Fr. 
116.6 
204.5 
It. 
1.4 
6.5 
Neth. 
18.7 
47.2 
Belg. 
46.3 
141.4 
EEC 
383.2 
902.2 
UK 
318.7 a 
694.5 
Source:  European Community Statistical  Office  (Energy  Statistics  Series). 
different  forms  of  transport,  in  the  amount  of 
resources  devoted  to  research  and  development,  in 
the degree of loca:tional  mobility, in the markets in 
which products are sold,  and in the  quality  of the 
infrastructure. 
Regions  recently divided 
by a frontier 
The Iron Curtain has divided regions which were 
once  cohesive  units.  As  a  resu1t  of  this  major 
political upheaval Jines of communication have been 
cut, resources are no longer available and marketing 
arrangements  have  disintegrated.  In  Germany  this 
is  particularly  true  of  the  region  of  Franconia.  A 
similar  situation  is  found  in  northern  Italy  in  the 
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region of Trieste-Gorizia where the new frontier has 
aHered  communication  links  with  Yugoslavia  and 
the Danube. 
A quite distinct affect of frontiers  upon economic 
regions  can  be  detected  along  frontiers  within  the 
EEC, where prior to the formation of the EEC and 
especially  prior  to  1939,  industrial  expansion  in 
frontier  zones  was  not  attractive  to  entrepreneurs. 
The formation of the EEC has changed the picture 
and new  adjustments  must  be made in the light of 
the ohanged conditions (to follow). 
Further reading 
Hans  VON  DER  GROEBEN,  Regional  Policy  in  an  Integrated  Europe, 
European  Community  Information  Service  (Community  Topic, 
No.  33),  1969. 
Memorandum  on  Regional  Policy  in  the  Community,  Commission  of 
the  European  Communities  (Supplement  to  Bulletin  No.  12  of  the 
European Communities,  1969). European  Studies,  9,  1970. 
Nordic  integration  after  world  war  II 
What is  integration?  Nils Andren who  is  Associate Professor  of Political Science  at the 
University  of  Stockholm  in  an  article  entitled  "Nordic  Integration"  which  appeared  in 
Cooperation and Conflict, Edition I,  1967,  defines integration as  follows: 
"Integration is a process which transforms a system in  such a manner that the mutual 
interdependence of its components is increased." 
This is  the definition of integration which  will be  used as a basis  for  this article  in  which 
the mutual interdependence of the Scandinavian countries will be  described and discussed. 
The deep feeling  of solidarity which grew out of the war 
proved fertile ground for post-war cooperation in Scandina-
via.  The decade  following  World War II  brought decisive 
developments  in  Scandinavian  cooperation.  One  of  the 
most  dramatic  attempts  at  integration  just  after  the  war 
was the projected defence alliance of Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway. 
The projected  defence  alliance 
The event which was  directly responsible for bringing up 
the question of a defence alliance was  the Communist coup 
d'Etat in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the misgivings 
which  were  felt  about this  in Scandinavia  and the  rest  of 
Europe. 
A Scandinavian committee on defence consisting of repre-
sentatives from Denmark, Norway and Sweden was  set up 
in  October  1948  to  make  a  preliminary  report.  Finland, 
because of her Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual 
assistance with the Soviet Union which was signed in April 
1948,  could not be  represented  on  this  Scandinavian  com-
mittee for defence.  The Committee in its report of January 
1949  declared  that  joint  military  action  would  materially 
facilitate  the  defence  of  Scandinavia  provided  that  such 
action was  prepared in peacetime within the framework  of 
a  defence  union.  It stressed  the  need  to  import essential 
raw materials and fuel as Scandinavia was not self-sufficient 
in these commodities and the need to build up Denmark's 
and  Norway's  defence  forces  which  had  been  completely 
disorganised by the Germans during the occupation. 
Despite  the  fact  that  Sweden  was  heavily  armed  while 
Norway and Denmark were  without arms and defenceless, 
the  Swedish  government proposed  a  defence  union  of the 
three countries.  The Swedes stipulated, however,  that such 
an alliance should remain outside the Eastern and Western 
power blocs.  More specifically, this meant that Scandinavia 
should remain  outside  the Atlantic  Pact which  the  United 
States was developing at this time. 
For Norway the decisive question was whether she could 
remain  outside  the  Atlantic  Pact  and  still  secure  supplies 
of war materials from the West.  Denmark tried to reconcile 
the Swedish and Norwegian views. 
The United  States,  however,  insisted  on  membership  of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a condi-
tion for  supplying  arms  to  the  Nordic countries.  At two 
meetings of leading Danish, Norwegian and Swedish cabinet 
ministers  and  members  of parliament held  in Copenhagen 
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and Oslo in late January 1949, it was agreed that a Scandina-
vian Defence Alliance was  no longer feasible.  As a  result, 
first  Norway,  then  Denmark  and later  Iceland,  joined  the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  Thus Scandinavia was 
divided  as  regards  defence  policy.  Sweden  was  neutral; 
Finland  had  made  a  friendship  agreement  with  Russia  in 
1948 which also recognised Finland's efforts to keep outside 
the  great  power  blocs  and  thus  secured  her  neutrality; 
Norway, Denmark and Iceland joined NATO. 
It might have been feared that the failure  of the defence 
alliance  would  shatter  all  other  aspects  of  Scandinavian 
integration.  But cooperation  among  the  Scandinavians  in 
other fields  was  intensified.  Leading  politicians  in all five 
countries  realised  the  urgent  need  for  achieving  results  in 
other fields  to offset  the consequences  of the  disagreement 
in foreign policy. 
Intergovernmental 
cooperation 
Joint meetings of cabinet ministers and the foreign minis-
ters  of the  Scandinavian  countries  became  more frequent. 
Until  1956  Finland did not take part in the foreign  minis-
ters'  meetings  but  was  usually  represented  when  the 
ministers  of social  welfare,  justice,  education  and  fisheries 
met in the various capitals at more or less  regular intervals. 
When the study of economic problems was  organised on a 
more  permanent  basis  in  1954,  Denmark,  Norway  and 
Sweden  set  up  a  committee  of three  cabinet  ministers  to 
supervise this work.  Finland joined this  in  1956. 
A number of permanent Scandinavian organs of coopera-
tion usually  made up of government officials  were  formed 
in the  post-war years  to investigate current problems.  At 
present there are five such bodies dealing with social policy, 
general legislation,  cultural matters,  transport and commu-
nications problems and economic cooperation.  Apart from 
the  last committee which  Finland did not join until  1956, 
she  took  a  very  active  part in the  work of all  these  per-
manent bodies.  Moreover the chief administrative  officers 
of government railways, postal and telegraph services, broad-
casting  companies,  factory  inspection,  customs  authorities 
and  health  services,  meet  for  more  informal  but  quite 
regular discussions. Some achievements 
Disappearing frontiers.  The northern countries now form 
a single passport zone both for their own nationals and for 
the nationals of other countries.  An agreement to abolish 
passports was  signed by the Scandinavian countries in 1954 
except by Iceland which later followed suit.  The abolition 
of  passport  formalities  between  the  Nordic  countries  is 
related  to  a  considerable  relaxation  of  customs  controls 
which  has  taken  place  at  the  same  time.  Most  customs 
controls are now restricted to random checks. 
The  removal  of  these  restrictions  has  resulted  in  an 
increase in travel between the Nordic countries. 
Cooperation  in  transport  and  communications.  Soon 
after the war a Nordic Parliamentary Communications Com-
mittee was set up.  The growth of inter-Scandinavian travel 
is  reflected in the number of journeys taking place between 
Sweden and the other countries.  In the first five  years after 
the abolition of passport controls the number rose by more 
than  100  per  cent  to  sixteen  million  per  year.  Another 
important  result  of  Northern  cooperation  was  Sweden's 
decision  to  go  over  to  right-hand  driving  on roads.  The 
great increase in road traffic between the Northern countries 
made left-hand driving in Sweden a  danger to road safety. 
Despite the great expense and the many technical problems 
the  Swedish  Government decided  to  introduce  the  reform 
in  1967.  Other measures  of cooperation  to improve  road 
safety  are  also  projected  including  the  standardization  of 
road  signs  and  traffic  regulations.  There  is  also  close 
cooperation  on  road  building  techniques,  traffic  research, 
accident  research,  etc.  In  shipping  there  are  reciprocal 
arrangements in coastal shipping between Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden and there is cooperation in icebreaker, meteoro-
logical and sea rescue services. 
Cooperation in aviation.  The most successful example of 
Scandinavian cooperation  in transport  is  the Scandinavian 
Airlines  system  (SAS).  In  the  late  'thirties  the  special 
difficulties  facing  aviation  companies  of  small  countries 
induced the national airline companies of Denmark, Norway 
and  Sweden  to  collaborate  in  serving  long-distance  inter-
continental routes, notably across the Atlantic.  Immediately 
after the war in 1945  the negotiations for such cooperation 
was  resumed  and  on  1st  August  1946  the  three  aviation 
companies  and  a  second  Swedish  company  established  a 
joint  company  to  serve  the  Western  hemisphere-The 
Scandinavian  Airlines  System.  Initially  the  scope  of this 
traffic  was  limited  to  transatlantic  services  with  the  three 
national  companies  competing  for  European  traffic.  This 
was uneconomic and eventually it was decided to rationalise 
and after negotiations in which the three governments took 
part an  agreement  was  signed  on  8th  February  1951  to 
reorganise  SAS  into  one  really  unified  and  jointly  owned 
trust company.  Flying certificates for the Scandinavian air-
line  crews  were  made  valid  for all  of the  three  countries. 
Finland  and  Iceland  operate  separate  airline  companies 
(Finnair  and  Icelandair).  They  are  financially  successful 
and operate international  services  on a  smaller scale  than 
SAS. 
Tourist  cooperation.  Tourist organisations  used  to  aim 
their  propaganda  at  attracting  tourists  to  Denmark,  or 
Norway,  or  Sweden  or  Finland.  Now  because  of  the 
expansion of communications the slogan is  "Visit Scandina-
via".  The  establishment  of SAS,  gave  an impetus  to  the 
common  tourist  propaganda  but  cooperation  among  the 
national  travel  associations  began  as  soon  as  1926  within 
the framework  of the  Scandinavian Traffic Committee. 
A  common  labour  market.  On  1st  July  1954  all  the 
Scandinavian countries except Iceland signed a new conven-
tion  abolishing  work  permits  for  wage  earners  in  all  the 
signatory  countries.  The  self-employed  and  professional 
occupations  were  not covered  by  the  convention  initially 
but now it also applies to teachers and will soon be extended 
to doctors, dentists and other health service workers. 
The  convention  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
labour  exchanges  of  the  various  countries  would  effect 
transfers of manpower whenever necessary.  The convention 
also  contains provision  for exchange  of information about 
the  labour markets  of the  participating countries.  But in 
fact nearly all the workers who have found employment in 
another Scandinavian country have found  their jobs under 
their own initiative without governmental assistance. 
A common labour market is an obvious advantage to the 
economics of the Scandinavian countries.  Industries needing 
manpower can get it more easily from a  large than from a 
small  area.  Similarly  it  is  easier  for  workers  to  find 
employment  when  they  are  not  confined  to  their  home 
labour market.  Moreover  the  differences  in the economic 
structure  of the  Scandinavian countries  make for different 
tendencies in the supply and demand of labour.  And with 
a  common labour market these differences  are evened  out. 
For  example,  there  is  usually  ample  employment  to  be 
found  in the Swedish and Norwegian  forests  and factories 
when economic activity is low in Denmark. 
Most of those who want jobs are either Danes or Finns 
and Sweden is still the most attractive country to find  work 
in.  After Sweden  the  flow  is  mainly  to Norway and it is 
mainly  Danes  who  are  attracted  there.  The  number  of 
workers  who  have  gone  to  Denmark is  smaller  and  there 
are few immigrant workers from other countries in Finland. 
Cooperation in  Social  Security.  It is  easily  appreciated 
that a common labour market will not be viable unless steps 
are  taken to insure  the immigrant worker against sickness, 
unemployment  and  other  misfortunes.  Cooperation  in 
social policy in Scandinavia had already made great progress 
before  the  Common  Labour  Market  was  begun.  But  in 
1955,  the  year  after  the  Common  Labour  Market  was 
introduced, a  social  security convention was  introduced by 
which  all  the  Scandinavian  countries  agreed  to  treat  the 
nationals  of the other Scandinavian countries on the same 
basis  as  their own nationals with respect to  social  security 
benefits. 
A Scandinavian who is residing in a Scandinavian country 
other than his  own obtains in principle full benefit from the 
social security schemes in force in the country of residence. 
The social  security scheme in his  country of origin is  thus 
not the determining factor.  Nor is  the convention based on 
a  system of remittances from the home country.  The host 
country meets all the costs in the  same way  as it does for 
its  own  nationals.  The  employed  person  must,  however, 
pay  the  social  security  contributions  in  the  host  country. 
The services covered by this convention were as follows: 
i.  Old-age pensions and supplementary benefits; 
ii.  Aid to destitute persons; 
iii.  Sickness benefits; 
iv.  Accident benefits; 
v.  Maternity benefits and allowances; 
vi.  Disablement benefits; 
vii.  Benefits  for  orphans  and  children  with  only  one 
parent; 
viii.  Benefits for children born out of wedlock; 
ix.  Family allowances; 
x.  Unemployment benefits; 
xi.  Widows pensions. 
A  supplementary  convention  (1959)  provided  for  the 
harmonization of rules of payment of old age pensions.  This 
list is  being  added  to in order to  maximise  the integration 
of social legislation in Scandinavia. 
The  channels  of  cooperation.  There  are  at  present 
three  different  levels  on which  inter-governmental  co-ope-
ration  is  carried out in Scandinavia.  First,  direct  contact 
is  maintained  on  the  level  of  ministers.  The  Foreign 
A,ffairs  ministers,  for  example,  meet  twice  a  year, 
while  the  Ministries  of Justice cooperate even more exten· 
sively  by  holding  three  or  more  meetings  per  year, 
attempting  to coordinate legislation  in Scandinavia.  Also, SCANDINAVIAN  INTEGRATION 
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At  the  end  of  the  14th  Century  the  Northern  Kingdoms  of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden were united under one ruler, 
the Danish born Queen Margarethe.  It was her aim to unite 
the North in  one Kingdom and this culminated in  the Union 
of  Kalmar.  This  union  authorised  the  merchants  of Swe-
den, Finland  (which was then a part of Sweden), Denmark 
and  Norway to trade freely within the political union.  This 
economic unity was  maintained in  varying degrees until the 
middle of the 17th Century. 
This Treaty,  which  marked the breakdown of  the  Union  of 
Kalmar, was a turning point towards economic disintegration 
in Scandinavia. 
Further  splits among  the  Scandinavian  countries occurred 
during  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Sweden-Finland  joined  Eng-
land while Denmark-Norway were on  the French side. 
The King of Denmark was compelled to cede Norway to the 
Swedish  King.  This treaty broke up the Danish-Norwegian 
union. 
The Norwegians proclaimed their independence, adopted a 
free  constitution,  established  a  parliament  and  elected  a 
Danish prince King of Norway. 
Norway  had  to  accept the  Swedish  Monarch  as  King  and 
agree  to  a  common  foreign  policy  with  Sweden,  but  she 
retained  her  newly-born  independence  in  complete  self-
government in  internal  affairs. 
This was  a tariff agreement between  Norway and  Sweden. 
The  first group to  find  hope  in  Nordic  solidarity were  the 
students and university teachers. 
The first Scandinavian meeting of natural scientists. 
First  conference  of Scandinavian  economists. 
First meeting of Scandinavian Lawyers. 1872-1914 
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Founding of the Norden Association 
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Foreign  Ministers of Norway,  Denmark,  Fin· 
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Neighbour  Country  Boards  or  Delegations 
for the Promotion of Economic Co-operation 
between  the  Northern  Countries 
il!l! 
The  Scandinavian  Countries  jointly  adopt 
new rules of neutrality 
The Second World War 
Intra-Union  Act-the customs  agreement  between  Norway 
and Sweden was terminated. 
The dissolution of the  political union  between  Norway and 
Sweden. 
The Scandinavian States were drawn closer together during 
this  period.  They  issued  identical  declarations of neutral-
ity.  The economic crisis created by the war compelled the 
Scandinavians to  pool their resources. 
in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
This  is  a  non-political  association  which  aims ·to  promote 
Nordic  integration  through  furthering  cultural  and  profes-
sional contacts. 
Founding of the Norden Association in  Iceland 
Founding of the Norden Association in  Finland 
The main theme of their discussion was a proposal tor joint 
action in trade and currency problems. 
were  established  by  the  meeting  of  Foreign  Ministers  in 
Stockholm. 
The countries became involved in the war against their will. 
Iceland  and  the  Faroe  Isles  were  occupied  by  the  British 
and their allies; Denmark and Norway were occupied by the 
Germans;  Finland  was  in  the  other camp  allied  with  Ger-
many  against  the  Soviet  Union  from  1941-1944,  Sweden 
succeeded in remaining neutral. the Ministers of Social Affairs, Health and Hygiene, Educa-
tion, Communications and Commerce have regular meetings 
for  similar purposes.  These  meetings  have  been  enlarged 
and  increased  in  frequency  due  to  the  existence  of  the 
Nordic Council. 
Secondly, there are permanent bodies  of cooperatiOn  on 
the  level  below  the  ministries,  particularly  in  the  cultural 
and social fields.  These bodies  work in close  cooperation 
with  both the  ministries  and the  Nordic  Council, with  the 
flow  of information  going  both ways.  Thirdly,  there  are 
at present estimated to  be around one  hundred or more ad 
hoc  committees  working  on  specific  aspects  of  Nordic 
collaboration. 
The Nordic Council 
Origins.  One  of  the  positive  results  of  the  abortive 
defence union talks was that the parliamentarians of Scandi-
navia  were  brought  together  for  joint  talks  for  the  first 
time.  From these meetings of parliamentarians the idea of 
a  Scandinavian  parliamentary  body  grew.  When  all  the 
Scandinavian countries except Finland joined the Council of 
Europe in 1949 and discussed problems with countries which 
were  far  removed  from  Scandinavia  the  need  for  a  joint 
Scandinavian  parliamentary  body  was  felt  even  more 
strongly.  Thus the  permanent inter-parliamentary  body of 
cooperation  called  the  Nordic  Council  was  set  up by  the 
parliaments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Iceland and 
held its first meeting in 1952.  Finland joined the organiza-
tion in 1955. 
Structure,  aims  and  function.  The  Nordic  Council 
consists of members of parliament elected by their respective 
legislative assemblies and representatives of the governments 
of the five  nations. 
The  Nordic  Council  is  a  consultative  body  only  and 
cannot  take  any  decision  which  will  bind  the  individual 
countries.  The statutes as amended in 1957 at the Council's 
Fifth Session held in Helsinki limit its aims  to consultation 
among the respective parliaments and governments of Den-
mark,  Finland,  Iceland,  Norway  and  Sweden  in  matters 
involving  joint  action  by  any  or  all  of  these  countries. 
Thus matters affecting two or more of the countries may be 
dealt  with  by  the  Nordic  Council.  The Statutes  say  that 
the Council should concern  itself in principle with current 
problems on which  direct action can  be taken  and  should 
abstain  from  making  declarations  about  future  goals  for 
which no immediate measures can be proposed.  It submits 
recommendations  for  joint,  co-ordinative  or  integrative 
efforts in  the field  of law, economics,  culture,  communica-
tions and social affairs. 
The Council consists  of 69  elected delegates-the parlia-
ments of Denmark, Finland,  Norway  and Sweden  electing 
16 delegates and Iceland 5 delegates to  the Council and the 
necessary  number of deputy  delegates.  Different  political 
opinions  in  each  country  should  be  represented.  Each 
Government may appoint from among its members as many 
Government representatives  as  it desires  but they  have  no 
vote in Council.  The Council has an ordinary session  once 
a year and extraordinary sessions if the Council so  decides 
or if a  meeting  is  requested  by  not less  than two  govern-
ments  or not less  than 25  elected  delegates.  The Council 
elects a President and four Vice-Presidents from the elected 
delegates  thus  constituting  the  Presidium  of  the  Council 
which is its executive body.  The delegation of each country 
appoints a Secretary and other staff members who are super-
vised  by  the  Presidium.  Elected  delegates  form  standing 
committees to do preparatory work during ordinary sessions 
and special  committees  can be  set up  between  sessions  to 
do preparatory work. 
All Governments  and delegates  are entitled  to  submit a 
matter to the Council.  The Council discusses  questions  of 
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common  interest  to  the  countries  and  may  make  recom-
mendations  to  the  Governments.  These  recommendations 
are not, however, binding.  On the other hand it is obvious 
that recommendations  adopted  by  a  large  majority  of the 
Nordic  Council  will  carry  considerable  weight  with  the 
individual  parliaments  and  governments,  particularly  since 
the  political  parties  generally  elect  their  leading and  most 
influential men to the Council.  Governments  have  to  sub-
mit an  annual report on the action which  they have taken 
on the recommendations of the previous session. 
The  bureaucratic  machine  of  the  Council  is  relatively 
small.  The establishment of this  new  body resulted in the 
coordination  of already  existing  Scandinavian  cooperation 
through  ministerial  conferences,  government  departments 
and permanent bodies.  The legislative  assemblies  are now 
drawn into the work on a much greater scale than ever before 
and consequently the problems of Scandinavian cooperation 
have come to occupy a central position at government level. 
As  a  result integration has  been  greatly accelerated  by  the 
more  vigorous  initiative  of  the  parliamentarians.  At the 
same  time  contacts  are  established  through  the  peoples' 
elected  representatives  with  a  wide  range  of organisations 
in  various  fields  thus  helping  directly  or  indirectly  to 
promote Scandinavian unity. 
The Helsinki Treaty 
In  1959  Denmark,  Norway  and  Sweden  joined  EFTA. 
In March 1962  when negotiations were in progress between 
Denmark,  Norway  and  the  EEC  for  membership  of  the 
Common Market and Sweden had made her application for 
association  with  the  EEC  the  Scandinavians  found  it 
desirable to clarify their relationship with each other in the 
Helsinki Agreement. 
This Agreement was largely a declaration of intent, setting 
out certain general  principles  of cooperation and listing in 
34 articles the results of cooperation already achieved.  One 
innovation was  that the Nordic Council was  given the right 
to be consulted on important questions.  The Treaty as such 
includes  no  binding  obligations.  It reflects  the  need  to 
embody in a  written form  the  various forms  of previously 
non-codified cooperation among the Scandinavian states.  Its 
importance is  as a means of increasing Nordic identification 
and as  such the Treaty carries weight psychologically. 
The planned Nordic 
Customs Union 
After  the  failure  of the  Scandinavian  Defence  Alliance 
the second  approach to  a  more formal  kind  of integration 
was  in  the  economic  sphere  and  was  a  long  drawn  out 
affair  stretching  from  1947-1959.  It  reached  a  fairly 
advanced  stage  of  planning  before  it  was  overtaken  by 
EFT  A.  It was  then resurrected again in the N ordek plans 
of 1968. 
In July 1947  the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway  and  Sweden  met  and  the  Norwegian  Minister 
proposed  the  establishment  of  a  special  committee  to 
investigate  the  possibility  of  further  development  of 
economic  cooperation  in  Scandinavia.  In  February  1948 
these  ministers  set  up  the  Joint  Nordic  Committee  for 
Economic  Cooperation.  The  experts  on  this  committee 
were given the task of investigating the possibilities of 
a) establishing  a  common  external  Northern  tariff  as  a 
preliminary step towards a customs union; 
b)  reducing  inter-Scandinavian  tariffs  and  quantitative 
restrictions; c)  increasing  division  of  labour  and  specialisation  in 
Scandinavia  in  cooperation  with  appropriate  private 
organisations; and 
d)  expanding previous Nordic commercial cooperation. 
This Committee made a preliminary report to the govern-
ments of Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in January 
1950.  It reported that a customs union of the four countries 
would bring eventual advantage through larger scale produc-
tion  resulting  from  an  enlarged  market  of  ap~roximately 
fourteen million persons.  It would also make the countries 
more competitive internationally. 
Finland  joined  the  planning  committee  known  as  the 
Nordic Economic Cooperation Committee (NECC) in 1956. 
The research  of the  previous  years  culminated in a  report 
which NECC submitted in October  1957  to the  Ministerial 
Committee.  The report was  in five  volumes  and included 
a  general  plan  for  a  common  Nordic  market  to  include 
80  per cent of current intra-Scandinavian  trade;  comments 
on  the  problems  of  particular  branches  of  industry  and 
other problems  of cooperation;  a  proposal  for a  common 
schedule of tariffs and transitional measures. 
A further report was completed in 1958 on the last 20 per 
cent  of  intra-Nordic  trade.  Later  in  1958  the  countries 
accepted the Nordic Council's recommendation to commence 
negotiations  for  Nordic  economic  cooperation.  But  these 
plans  for  a  Common Nordic  market  were  shelved  in  the 
course  of  EFT  A  negotiations  in  June,  July  1959  when 
Norway, Sweden  and  Denmark joined EFTA.  The EFTA 
negotiations proceeded rapidly, spurred by the desire to face 
the EEC with a united front. 
The Stockholm convention which founded EFTA in July 
1959  together  with  the  vacillation  of  the  Scandinavian 
governments  about the  Nordic  market as  expressed at the 
1958  session  of  the  Nordic  Council  sealed  the  doom  of 
the Nothern Customs Union.  Through EFT  A, Scandinavian 
economic  integration  has  been  sublimated into  continental 
dimensions.  Reflecting  the  characteristic  Scandinavian 
emphasis  on practical  ends  rather  than  on integration  for 
its  own  sake  Scandinavian  leaders  have  concluded  that 
expectations of increased national product can best be  met 
on  a  European  basis  rather  than  a  Nordic  one-hence 
Denmark  and  Norway's  applications  to  join  the  EEC  as 
full  members and Sweden's application for association with 
the EEC in 1961,  1967  and 1969. 
Nordek 
There  have,  however,  been  more  concrete  examples  of 
formal Nordic economic integration recently.  The Scandina-
vian countries negotiated as  a  single joint delegation in the 
Kennedy Round, which  was  a  sweeping  revision  of GATT 
tariffs.  Secondly  the  Scandinavian  countries  revived  the 
idea of institutionalized Nordic cooperation in the  form of 
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the  N ordek  plan.  The  countries  had  developed  different 
policies  of alliance  vis-a-vis the EEC and EFTA.  Norway 
and  Denmark  had  applied  for  membership  of  the  EEC, 
Sweden  had  applied  for  association  and  Finland  had  not 
made  any  overtures  to  Brussels;  Norway,  Denmark  and 
Sweden  were  members  of  EFT  A  and  Finland  was  an 
Associate  Member  of EFTA.  Worried  by this  splintering 
the  Danish  Government  put  forward  a  proposal  for 
extended and institutionalised Nordic cooperation.  A draft 
treaty was  presented on 15th July  1969.  The Nordek plan 
envisaged  the  creation  of  a  customs  union  and  extensive 
cooperation  in  agricultural  and  fishing  matters.  It aimed 
at a  far  reaching  harmonization of trade  policy, economic 
policy, industrial policy etc.,  and it was  intended to set up 
a  financial  institution  to  encourage  and  support  Nordic 
investments.  By  February  1970  the  negotiations  had 
matured to  the  point where  an agreement in principle was 
announced  to sign  the  proposed  treaty.  Today,  however, 
the fate of N ordek has become uncertain to say the least as 
the result of a last minute volte-face of the Finnish Govern-
ment, who felt that it would put a  strain on the all impor-
tant  Finnish-Soviet  relations.  The  other  two  problems 
which  have  so  far  prevented  the  signing  of  the  Nordek 
Treaty  have  been  agriculture  and  the  political  goals  and 
consequences  specifically  with  regard  to  relations  with  the 
EEC. 
But  the fact  that the  Nordek negotiations  had advanced 
as  far  as  they  had  shows  that  the  four  Nordic  countries 
believe  that  they  have  a  vested  interest  in  pooling  their 
resources more effectively through the creation of a common 
Nordic  Market  of  20  million  producers  and  consumers. 
Their  problem  will  be  how  to  reconcile  their  interest  in 
Nordic  cooperation  with  their  interest  in  wider  European 
markets. 
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